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Inñation, expectations and nnonetary
policy
In this speech,'^ ' Professor David Blanchflower/^' member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC),
talks about the importance of inflation expectations for monetary policy making. He discusses what
has happened to inflation and inflation expectations in recent months, and what actions should be
taken in this area in the context of the current conjuncture. He then identifies four distinct phases
of the downturn in the United States, and notes a number of similarities with the United Kingdom,
suggesting that in the United Kingdom we may see a substantial decline in growth, a pickup in
unemployment, and declining consumption growth driven by significant declines in house prices.
He emphasises the importance of getting ahead of the curve in order to head off these downside
risks.
Introduction
It is a great pleasure to be addressing you here this evening at
the David Hume Institute. I am a strong believer in Hume's
own view that we should not seek to solely explain events and
behaviour with theoretical models, rather, as Hume wrote in
h\s A Treatise of Human Nature, we should use 'experience and
observation' iethe empirical method. As Arnold Harberger
(1993) famously said 'economics is fundamentally an
observational discipline'. I even made a speech on this theme
last year entitled The economics of walking about'
(Blanchflower (2007a)). In the United Kingdom economics has
traditionally tended to emphasise the importance of theory,
downplaying the role of observation.(3)
In this speech I am going to talk about the current conjuncture
and especially what has happened to inflation and inflation
expectations recently and what should be done about it. I am
particularly concerned that the United Kingdom exhibits broad
similarities to the US experience. It does seem to me that we
really know very little, in 2008, about how truly to stabilise
economies and run them properly in the face of shocks both to
commodity prices and to credit. We are probably in the grip of
world forces that are greater than most people realise.
Forecasting is thus very difficult at such times, I believe more
action is needed to prevent the United Kingdom falling into
recession. An important first step is the Bank of England's
Special Liquidity Scheme to increase liquidity into the system
announced last week. Monetary policy in my view still
remains restrictive currently, and we need to take action to
loosen policy sooner rather than later. I do feel that the slower
rates fall, the further they will eventually have to go down to
boost the economy.
Inflation in the United Kingdom and the
monetary policy framework
The Bank's monetary policy objective is to deliver price
stability — low inflation — and, subject to that, to support the
Government's economic objectives including those for growth
and employment. The inflation target is symmetric, and if the
target is missed by more than 1 percentage point on either side
— ie if the annual rate of CPI inflation is more than 3% or less
than 1% — the Governor of the Bank must write an open letter
to the Chancellor explaining the reasons why inflation has
increased or fallen to such an extent and what the Bank
proposes to do to ensure inflation comes back to the target.
This has happened only once so far, in March 2007,
Inflation in the United Kingdom was high and unstable in the
1970s and 1980s. Following the 1973 and 1979 oil price
shocks, inflation was greater than 10% for much of the 1970s,
with RPI reaching a high of just over 26% in 1975. Inflation
targeting was adopted in the United Kingdom in 1992, and in
1997 the Bank of England was granted independence to set
interest rates to meet the Government's inflation target. Since
1997, inflation in the United Kingdom has been relatively low
and stable.
(1) This is an abbreviated version of a speech delivered at the Royal Society, George
Street, Edinburgh on 29 April 2008. The full version can be found on the Bank's
website at www bankofengland.co. u k/pubiications/speeches/2008/speech346.pdf.
(2) Bruce V Rauner Professor, Dartmouth College, University of Stirling, IZA, CESifo and
NBER. I am most grateful to Mike Goldby, Roger Kelly, Helen Lawton and Nicki Scott
for their invaluable assistance in preparing this speech, and to colleagues for helpful
comments.
(3) In the United States there is a much stronger tradition in empirical work. The
National Bureau of Economic Research, where I am a research associate, which is the
pre-eminent organisation of economists, and which is responsible for dating
recessions, emphasises the importance of empirical work. The NSER concentrates on
four types of empirical research, developing new statistical measurements,
estimating quantitative models of economic behaviour, assessing the effects of public
policies on the US economy, and projeaing the effects of alternative policy proposals.
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In recent months there has been strong upward pressure on UK
inflation, because of higher global prices, particularly for
energy and food. The price of oil has reached record highs of
almost $120 a barrel for US light crude and annual food price
inflation is currently estimated to be running at over 5%.
These higher global prices have been compounded by the
recent fall in the sterling effective exchange rate.
The MPC's central projection is for CPI inflation to rise quite
sharply in the short term, and be considerably above the 2%
target for much of the rest of 2008, The reason for the
projected increase in the short term is because commodity and
import price increases are likely to work their way through the
supply chain and may put upward pressure on prices beyond
the energy and food sectors. Further ahead, the Bank expects
inflation to fall back as commodity prices stabilise.
There are considerable risks to this forecast. The risks to
inflation on the downside are of more concern to me than
those to the upside, and I think that the probability of having
to write an open letter to the Chancellor because inflation has
fallen beíow 1% at some point before the end of my present
term on the MPC is rising. As I said in my recent testimony to
the Treasury Select Committee, I am concerned about the
possibility of seeing something 'horrible', which I think is more
likely to arise in the real economy.
These risks to the downside have increased since the February
Inflation Report was published, as new data have come in
suggesting that the prospects for the real economy have
slipped, driven by declining house prices and limited credit
availability. According to the Royal Institute of Chartered
Surveyors, the number of estate agents saying house prices
rose, rather than fell, has dropped to the lowest point since the
survey began in 1978; the new instructions to sell balance and
the new buyer enquiries balance were both lower in March.
This confirms the bleak picture painted in the Halifax index
which reported a 2,5% monthly fall in house prices, the
biggest since 1992. Persimmon the house builders last week
reported a decline in sales volume of 24% on the year, and a
decline in sales value of 18%.
In my view a correction of approximately one third in house
prices does not seem implausible in the United Kingdom over a
period of two or three years if house price to earnings ratios
are to be restored to more sustainable levels. That would
mean the ratio of over six would have to come down to around
four which is closer to its long-run value. This is broadly in line
with the projections made by the IMF (2008) who note that
the United Kingdom is especially vulnerable to house prices
declines — along with France, Ireland and the Netherlands —
and suggest that UK house prices are 30% higher than justified
by fundamentals, I am not suggesting that such a drop will
necessarily occur, but it may. Cutting interest rates now may
help to prevent such a dramatic fall.
The downbeat news from the housing sector now seems to
have started to spread to the consumer. Surveys by the Bank's
Agents, BRC, CBI Distributive Trades have shown consumption
to be weakening. Consumer confidence is falling. For
example, the headline GfK consumer confidence balance fell in
February to its lowest level since December 1992, with all five
of the component balances falling.
The Bank's Agents report a weakening of employment
intentions in both services and manufacturing sectors. The
KPMC/REC Report on Jobs for March suggested that there had
been a slovi/ing in the growth of vacancies and demand for
labour and that wages were slackening. The Chartered
Institute of Personnel and Development had reported that the
proportion of businesses expecting to make some staff
redundant in the near term had risen. Total job losses in
London's financial district may hit 40,000, JPMorgan said
recently, doubling its previous forecasts. The most recent
labour market data published by the ONS {Labour Mari<et
Statistics. First Release, April 2008) suggests that the decline in
the numbers of unemployed has slowed. Total hours are
falling, and the number of part-time workers who can't find a
full-time job has increased. The labour market seems to be
turning.
Inflation expectations
But the extent to which inflation falls back in the face of a
potential slowdown depends to a large extent on what
happens to inflation expectations. Inflation expectations play
an important part in an inflation-targeting regime, although
what matters most for inflation prospects are the expectations
of those directly involved in setting prices and wages. Wages
are set on an infrequent basis, thus wage-setters have to form
a view on future inflation. If inflation is expected to be
persistently higher in the future, employees may seek higher
nominal wages in order to maintain their purchasing power.
This in turn could lead to upward pressure on companies'
output prices, and hence higher consumer prices. Additionally,
if companies expect general inflation to be higher in the future,
they may be more inclined to raise prices, believing that they
can do so without suffering a drop in demand for their output.
A third path by which inflation expectations could potentially
impact inflation is through their influence on consumption and
investment decisions.
What is of interest for monetary policy makers such as us in
the MPC are signs that expectations have become
de-anchored, which we can interpret as being the case if the
public reacts to a short period of higher-than-expected
inflation by increasing their long-run expectations. As we will
see, measuring inftation expectations is far from an exact
science, so measuring when they have become de-anchored is
certainly not easy. This is just one of the many uncertainties
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that we face as MPC members and which makes monetary
policy making interesting!
One of the problems we face is that we don't know how
individuals form expectations. Indeed, in practice, it is
probably impossible to generalise, as individuals are likely to
form their expectations heterogeneously, using different
information sets, relying on different models and having
different capacities for processing the information. This
heterogeneity is noted in a useful study from the Bank of
England (Driver and Windram {2007)). The study reports that
some households may form their expectations based on a
structural relationship, such as the trade-off between inflation
and unemployment or demand; others may use an empirical
approach, eg their recent memories of inflation data.
Furthermore, people may be entirely forward looking or
entirety backward looking, or a combination of both. In
inflation-targeting countries, people may simply assume
inflation will equal the target.
in a paper that is to be released today (Blanchflower and Kelly
(2008)), Roger Kelly and I have used data from the Bank of
England/NOP survey and the GfK surveys to provide some
broad generalisations about the macroeconomic literacy and
numeracy of different groups of people. We also look at how
good people are at forming inflation expectations. So while
we may not be able to specify how people form their
expectations, we can at least test howwell they are doing it.
The findings make for interesting reading.
First, there is evidence that significant numbers of individuals
do not know what the inflation rate is, or how it has changed,
and are increasingly unable to predict how it might change in
the future. This is consistent with recent evidence from the
United States suggesting very low levels of financial literacy.
Second, there is evidence of very high non-response rates in
these various surveys to questions on how satisfied
respondents are with the job the Bank of England has been
doing as well as to how much prices have risen in the past or in
the future, in all of these surveys non-response rates are
especially high among the least educated, females, individuals
with low incomes and the young. We cannot assume that
non-response implies a lack of understanding, but it is one
possibility. Chart 1 shows that this non-response — both of
expectations and perceptions — has risen a lot recently.
Third, we find that price expectations are strongly influenced
by past experience. There is evidence that expectations of the
future path of prices are highly correlated with an individual's
evaluation of current inflation.
Fourth, the probability of predicting inflation 'correctly' twelve
months ahead, that is within 1 percentage point either side of
the actual outcomes of the CPI or the RPi, is higher among
Chart 1 Non-response rates to inflation expectations
and perceptions
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Sources: Bankof England/NOP and CfK.
males, homeowners, workers, the more educated, richer
individuals and those living in the South East.
To what extent is this lack of knowledge of (and possible lack
of understanding of) rudimentary macroeconomic data an
issue? In monetary theory, inflation expectations affect
inflation through two main channels — by individuals
bargaining over nominal pay and companies setting prices. As
long as those who are actually in a position to influence the
rate of inflation (ie those who are in a position to bargain for
their wages/set prices) have an understanding of what
inflation is and a well-grounded expectation of what it is likely
to be in the future, then the assumption made in most
macroeconomic models, including the Bank of England's
Quarterly Model, that inflation expectations are
'model-consistent', holds. It Is probably safe to assume that
companies involved in setting prices are on the whole
sufficiently sophisticated to fall into this category. And
our findings above demonstrate that the awareness of
what inflation is (and the accuracy of people's
awareness/expectations of inflation) is higher among those
categories who tend to have higher employment rates (ie
males, the more educated, the employed, the 'not young' etc).
This is likely to be because the inflation rate is a far more
relevant concept to them, as they are likely to be in more of
a position to influence their income (through the
wage-bargaining process) than those who do not receive an
income from employment. So on this basis it would seem that
the assumption of model-consistent expectations is not
unreasonable.
What has happened to inflation expectations
in the recent past?
There are a number of possible ways to measure expectations,
It is instructive to see what has happened to these measures in
the recent past.
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Survey measures of household inflation expectations have
picked up markedly since early 2005 alongside the Increase in
inflation (Chart 2). As discussed earlier, there is evidence that
households' inflation expectations are closely related to their
perceptions of current inflation. Thus, some of the rise in
expectations in recent months is likely to reflect the rise in
inflation during 2005-06. However, expectations have
remained elevated during 2007 despite the easing in inftation
during the first half of the year.
forecasters for an assessment of the risks around their
forecasts. In the latest survey, published in the February
Infiatior) Report, CPI inflation in two and three years' time
was expected to be centred around the 2% target, with
only around a one-in-ten chance that it would exceed 3%
per annum over that horizon. At longer horizons, the latest
Consensus Economics survey of expectations of annualised
five-year RPIX inflation five years ahead, taken in
October 2007, was 2.5% and of CPI was 2% (Chart 3).
Chart 2 Consumer inflation expectations for the twelve
months ahead
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Household inflation expectations may also be influenced by
the degree of public coverage of inflation (Driver and Windram
(2007)). More frequent discussions of inflation may increase
awareness of inflation among members of the general public.
Newspaper coverage was on an upward trend through much of
2006 and rose sharply in early 2007 (Driver and Windram
(2007)). This may have contributed to the rise in households'
inflation expectations during this period. However, both
current CP! inflation and media coverage of inflation fell back
through 2007, while expectations remained elevated. This
may suggest that expectations are sticky, that is they may
persist at a new higher level for a period of time, despite actual
inflation moving down again. Or it may be that survey
respondents were more focused on RPl inflation, which did not
fall back as much as CPI.
It is possible that households believe that past above-target
inflation outturns, combined with the prospect of further
increases in inflation in the near term, are indicative of
monetary policy being less restrictive in the future. If so, the
rise in these short-term measures of inflation expectations
would contain information about medium-term beliefs, which
could have significant implications for wage and price-setting.
The average forecast by professional forecasters for CPI
inflation at the end of 2008 is 2.4%. This is expected to return
to 2% by the end of 2009.0) The Bank asks professional
Chart 3 Consensus and implied market forecasts of
inflation
Per cent
- •
Implied market five-year forward,
five years ahead (RPl)
1 1 1
Consensus (RPIX)
1 1 1 1 1 1
Consensus (CPI)
1 1 1 1
1993 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 0708
Sojrces: Bank of Engiand and Consensus Economics.
Financial market measures of inflation expectations are
derived from instruments linked to RPl rather than CPI
inflation, so movements could reflect changes in market
estimates of the wedge between the two rates rather than
changes in the markets' assessment of future inflation trends
more generally (Bank of England (2008)). The interpretation
of market-based measures is further complicated by the fact
that these instruments also reflect risk premia associated with
uncertainty about future inflation and liquidity, and they could
be influenced by institutional factors, for instance if large
institutional investors favoured attaching a higher value to
inflation protection. Implied RPl inflation forwards have
picked up steadily since 2005 at five-year horizons (Chart 3).
There is some evidence to suggest that strong pension fund
demand for inflation-protected bonds has pushed down their
yields relative to those on conventional bonds, thereby
pushing up implied inflation forwards.
Our concern on the MPC is whether inftation expectations
remain anchored. My colleague Andrew 5entance has argued,
and I agree with him, that the crucial test of whether inflation
expectations remain anchored is whether wages remain under
control. Wage settlements data show there has been little
pass-through, if any, of price increases to wages so far — wage
growth in the United Kingdom remains muted. My preferred
pay measure — hourly earnings of full-time workers in the
(!) Source; HM Treasury of forecasts received between 27 February and 5 March 2008.
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Labour Force Survey (LFS) — confirms earnings growth is
benign and slowing fairly sharply. I use hourly earnings rather
than weekly earnings to remove any variation caused by
changes in hours, which are declining currently. The LFS has
the great advantage that it is nationally representative of all
wage workers, In contrast to other national wage measures.
The latest ONS data - in the form of the AEI and AWE data —
suggests that the year-on-year change (three-month average)
of earnings with bonuses continues to fall. However, there are
strong grounds for believing that both the AEI and AWE
actually overstate earnings growth because the Monthly
Wages and Salaries Survey, on which they are both based,
excludes all workers employed in firms with less than
20 employees. It also excludes the self-employed. This
selection rule excludes 98.0% of all private sector firms and
39.4% of all private sector workers and 27.1% of all private
sector employees.0) This is important, as the wages of those in
the smallest firms in Britain tend to be particularly flexible
downwards in the face of changes in labour market conditions.
Furthermore, it tends to be the least skilled, who are
disproportionately located in small firms, who gain the most in
booms and lose the most in slumps. As a consequence, when
economic conditions change, the bias from excluding the
lowest part of the wage distribution also changes. Hence, the
wage data in the LFS are the most relevant wage statistics to
use as a labour market starts to loosen.
It is unclear whether workers will be able to resist further
erosion of their spending power, but I suspect they wilt be
unable to do so, certainly in the near term. I have argued for
some months now that wages are well controlled. Workers are
concerned about job security; one of my ex-students, who
works at a major financial institution in the City, told me his
boss had told him that his bonus this year was that he still had
a job.
So far I have highlighted the importance of inflation
expectations for monetary policy making. I don't believe that
inflation expectations have become de-anchored. I hope that
it Is clear that this is not me being complacent about inflation;
I have been inaccurately referred to as an 'arch-dove'. I simply
have not seen evidence of domestically driven medium-term
inflationary pressures, particularly in the labour market. If I
had seen these pressures, especially on the wage front, I would
have voted for increases in interest rates. In reality I focus on
what is going on in the data rather than having a
pre-determlned rate-setting agenda. David Hume would think
of me as a 'positive' economist in this sense. As I mentioned
earlier, I believe that we face a real risk that the
United Kingdom may fall into recession, and I am concerned
about the associated implications for inflation on the
downside. Despite the current short-term inflationary
pressures in the UK economy, my view is that there is a real
risk that inflation may undershoot the target in the medium
term, and take us into letter-writing territory; hence I am
generally inclined to loosen policy. Members ofthe MPC are
labelled doves and hawks based on their revealed preference
for tighter or looser monetary policy; it does not reflect the
degree to which they are concerned about inflation. We are all
concerned about inflation, that's our job. My votes have been
driven by my view that there are considerable amounts of
spare capacity in the economy — both within firms and in the
labour market. Hence, I have not expected to see much, if any,
domestically generated inflationary pressure, and so it has
turned out. And although output price inflation has risen
recently, I think the slack labour market will prevent any
second-round effects.
Similarities between the US and UK
experiences
The big question is where the UK economy is headed over the
next two to three years. I spend approximately half of my time
in the United Kingdom and half in the United States and so I
am probably quite well placed to make the comparison. For
some time now I have been gloomy about prospects in the
United States, which now seems clearly to be in recession. I
believe there are a number of similarities between the
United Kingdom and the United States which suggest that in
the United Kingdom we are also going to see a substantial
decline in growth, a pickup in unemployment, little if any
growth in real wages, and declining consumption growth
driven primarily by significant declines in house prices. The
credit crunch is starting to hit and hit hard.
I have identified four phases of the downturn in the
United States based on data up to 23 April 2008, as follows.
Phase 1 (January 2006-April 2007). The housing market
starts to slow from its peak around January 2006. Negative
monthly growth rates in house prices start to appear from the
autumn of 2006 (Chart 4).
Phase 2 (May 2007-August 2007). Substantial monthly falls
in house prices and housing market activity Including starts
and permits to build are observed from late spring/early
summer of 2007 Consumer confidence measures, alongside
qualitative labour market indicators, such as the proportion of
people saying jobs are plentiful, started to drop precipitously
from around September 2007 (Chart 5).
Phase 3 (September 2007-December 2007). Average hourly
earnings growth starts to slow from September 2007 as does
real consumption. The growth In private non-farm payrolls
starts to slow. House price and activity declines speed up
(Chart 6).
(1) Source: http://slats.berr.gov.uk/ed/sme, Table 1,
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Chart 4 United States — Phase 1
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Phase 4 (January 2008-), By approximately December 2007
the housing market problems have now spilled over into real
activity. The United States seems to have moved into
recession around the start of 2008, There have been big falls
in house prices. In March 2008 housing starts were at a
17-year low. Foreclosure filings Jumped 57% in March
compared with the same month tast year. One out of every
Chart 7 United States — Phase 4 (January 2008-)
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139 Nevada households received a foreclosure filing last
month, California was second with a rate of one in every 204
homes with Florida third with a rate of one in every 282 being
hit with a foreclosure filing. Mortgage application volume fell
14.2% during the week ending 18 April, according to the
Mortgage Bankers Association's weekly application survey.
Refinance volumes fell 20.2% on the week.
Nominal retail sales and real personal disposable income have
both fallen sharply since the start of the year (Chart 7). Real
annual GDP growth in 2007 Q4 is now down to +0.1%, from
1.2% in 2007 Q3.
Spending on big-ticket items in the United States is tumbling.
For example, Hartey-Davidson.the biggest US motorcycle
maker, is cutting jobs and reducing shipments to dealers amid
declining sales. Harley sold 14% fewer bikes in the
United States in the first three months of the year than in the
same period in 2007. US automakers such as GM and Ford
reported double-digit US sales declines in March as demand for
trucks and sport utility vehicles plummeted, with consumers
holding back because of concerns about gas prices, the
housing slump and tightening credit. Even McDonald's Corp.,
Chart 8 United States — manufacturing and construction
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the world's biggest restaurant company, has seen US
comparable-store sales fall 0.8% in March 2008, the first
decline since March 2003. Declines in employment to this
point in the United States have been concentrated in
manufacturing, construction and financial activities (Chatt 8).
There seem to be a number of similarities between the
United Kingdom and the United States: the big difference is
that in the United Kingdom the housing market was booming
in 2006 and most of 2007.
Phase 1 (August 2007-October 2007). House prices start to
slow in 2007 Q2 and 2007 Q3. Housing activity measures also
slow from around October 2007 (Chart 9).
Phase 2 (November 2007-January 2008). Consumer
confidence measures start slowing sharply also from around
October 2007 The qualitative labour market measures such as
the REC Demand for Staff index also start slowing from around
October 2007 (Chart 10).
Phase 3 (February 2008-). In early 2008 the Halifax index
and the RICS survey both suggest that house prices falls have
started to accelerate. The Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML)
recently announced that mortgage lending in March was down
17% on the year. Loan approvals are down, and the RICS ratio
of sales to stocks is down from 0.38 in September 2007 to
0.25 in March 2008 (Chart 11). Bradford and Bingley, Britain's
biggest buy-to-let lender, has recently reported that some
borrowers are finding it hard to repay their loans, so mortgage
arrears are growing, reminiscent of what has been happening
in the United States. The latest figures showed that the
number of people whose homes were repossessed in 2007
went up by 21%. The CML said 27,100 homes, the highest
figure since 1999, were taken over by lenders after people fell
behind with repayments. According to data published by the
British Bankers' Association, the number of mortgages granted
to homebuyers dropped last month by 47% below the same
month last year to its lowest level in more than a decade.
Some 35,417 mortgages were approved for home purchase in
March compared with 43,147 in February, a drop of 18%. As in
the United States, recent declines in employment in the
United Kingdom are concentrated in manufacturing,
construction and financial activities (Chart 12).
Phase 4 is coming. More bad news is on the way. I think it is
very plausible that falling house prices will lead to a sharp drop
in consumer spending growth. Developments in the
United Kingdom are starting to look eerily similar to those in
the United States six months or so ago. There has been no
decouplingof the two economies: contagion is in the air. The
United States sneezed and the United Kingdom is rapidly
catching its cold. I was especially taken by the following
statement in the latest minutes of the FOMC at their
March 2008 meeting:n)
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'some participants expressed concern that falling house
prices and stresses in financial markets could lead to a more
severe and protracted downturn in activity than currently
anticipated' 18 March 2008.
(1) Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee of the Board ot Governors of the
Federal Reserve on 18 March 2008, page S. Available at
www.f ed eralreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htmtfcalendars.
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Chart 12 United Kingdom— manufacturing and
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I have identical concerns for the United Kingdom. Generally,
forecasters have tended to underpredict the depth and
duration of cyclical slowdowns.
Conclusions
So what do we do? The job of the MPC is to focus on getting
inflation to the target in the medium term, and subject to that,
to support the Government's objectives for economic growth
and employment, as set out in the Monetary Policy
Committee's remit from the Chancellor.O)
This part of the legislation was presumably included precisely
for times such as this. We need to be mindful of the fact that
it is Her Majesty's Government that sets the terms of our remit
and the Bank of England simply implements it. Sam Brittan
may well have a point though,
'It is one thing for central banks to hold price increases
generated in their own countries or regions to 2 per cent. It
is quite another to compress them to offset potentially large
price increases emanating from outside their area. ...For the
time being, all that is required is some emphasis on the
domestic versus external elements in inflation in, for
instance, the monthly press conference of the ECB or the
letters the governor of the Bank of England is required
to write to the chancellor when inflation strays by more
than one percentage point from target.' Financial Times,
27 March 2008.
Currently, the MPC needs to look through the short-run
inflation outlook; keeping monetary policy too restrictive
would impact output and jobs negatively. At the present time
inflation in the United Kingdom is largely being driven by
imported goods, principally commodities, oil and food. I often
tell my students that when we advocate a policy prescription
we must always try to answer the question what if we are
wrong, what are the downside risks? There is a danger, but I
don't think it is a substantial one, that inflation expectations
become de-anchored. People understand that prices have
gone up because the price of oil has risen and that is not the
fault of the Bank of England. People are concerned about
falling house prices, low Incomes and the possibility of
negative equity. Indeed, there is evidence that people care
more about unemployment than they do about inflation
(Blanchflower (2007b)). The fear of unemployment is rising
(Blanchflower and Shadforth (2007)). We need to look
through the short-run hiccups in inflation that will occur
over the next few months. Our main priority now is to
ensure we conduct monetary policy in such a way that the
United Kingdom doesn't slip into recession, causing us to
significantly undershoot the ¡nflation target. It isn't too late.
Some commentators have argued that the MPC should
have been more aggressive in cutting interest rates in order
to head off the downside risks. I agree. My biggest concern
right now is that the credit crisis will trigger a rapid
downward spiral in activity. Now it is time to get ahead of
the curve.
(1) This remit is specified at least annually, the most recent (and unchanged) remit being
specified in a letter from the Chanceltor to the Governor on 11 March 2008.
Speeches Inflation, expectations and monetary policy 237
References
Bank of England (2008), Inflation Report. February,
Blanchflower, D C (2007a), 'Recent developments in the UK
economy: the economics of walking about', Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 47, No, 2. pages 317-29.
Blanchflower, D G (2007b), 'Is unemployment more costly than
inflation?', NBER Working Paper W13505, October.
Blanchflower, D C and Kelly, R (2008), 'Macroeconomic literacy,
numeracy and the implications for monetary policy', accompanying
paper referred to in this speech, available at
vi'ww-bankofengland,co,uk/publications/5peeches/2008/
speech346paper.pdf
Blanchflower, D G and Shadforth, C (2007), 'Fear, unemployment
and migration', NBER Working Paper W13506, October,
Driver, R and Windram, R (2007), 'Public attitudes to inflation and
interest rates'. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol, 47, No, Z,
pages 208-23.
Harberger, A (1993), 'The search for relevance in economies',
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol, 83,
pages 1-16,
International Monetary Fund (2008), World Economic Outlook:
Housing and the Business Cycle, April 2008, Washington DC.

